Putin’s ongoing disinformation strategy in Kazakhstan

In March 2022, the Russian Federation deployed its armies into Ukraine, commencing the largest war seen in Europe since the Second World War. The refugees displaced by this war of aggression has the UN calling this the “fastest growing humanitarian crisis in recent history” (Beaumont, 2022). However, just months prior, Russian forces had boots on the ground in another sovereign country. In January 2022, the Kazakh president, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, sought military support from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a post-Soviet military alliance led by Russia (Light, 2022). This was after protests against rising oil prices took to the streets. Then, the protests shifted from oil price to systemic corruption, something that has been simmering under the surface for many years. There were many scuffles with police and some people even gained control of critical infrastructure like the main airport (Noubel 2022). In total, Kazakh officials reported 227 people were killed (Rfe/rl, 2022).

In response to the (initially) peaceful protests, however, the government instituted an Internet blackout (Hu, 2022). Because of this, reliable information about the actors causing subsequent violence and entire instances of violence is debated. bne IntelliNews publishes business news in this region and they note the discrepancies between RT (a Russia-backed news source) and Kazakh state media. Their on-the-ground correspondent is generally wary of the unconfirmed reports, even saying they should, “be treated with caution, [and they] can assess [it as] fake news” (bne correspondent, 2022).

As an example, those tuned into RT viewed squadrons of soldiers shooting machine guns at unseen assailants and heard reports that, “dozens are dead, including ten policemen, and that three of those have been ‘beheaded.’” However, it is next to impossible to verify or confirm the reports because of reasons stated earlier. And, according to that Almaty correspondent, “people who live [in the city] say it has been peaceful all day. Nothing is happening.” This contradicts Russian media’s claims that some of the protesters have got access to guns (bne correspondent, 2022).

Once a beacon of stability, neighboring countries looked with shock as 3,000 Russian paratroopers arrived from the aforementioned CSTO (Walker & Bisenov, 2022). Afterwards, some outlets referred to those several days as “Bloody January” or the “January Tragedy.” By deploying his military to keep the peace in a foreign nation, Putin helps to enforce a narrative of dependency. A narrative years in the making and one which makes post-Soviet republics, and their citizens, victims. He achieves this through subtle, blatant, and reused misinformation tactics.

With the January civil unrest, Alexander Cooley (a professor of political science at Barnard College) expects Tokayev to be in Putin’s debt. Referring to the CSTO peacekeeping mission, he says, “it’s tailor-made for their kind of vision of what their role should be in Eurasia and Central Asia” (Mackinnon, 2022). This is one of many pillars of a political disinformation strategy employed by the Russian leader.

Kazakhstan’s long and supportive history with Russia presents a dynamic challenge for them. On one hand, a top official has said Kazakhstan will not help Russia to evade Western sanctions imposed on Moscow over its ongoing invasion of Ukraine to RadioFreeLibrary (Rfe/rl, 2022). On the other hand, the nation voted to abstain from condemning Russia’s invasion in the United General Assembly (Magid, 2022). But, the time-honored Russian strategy of misinformation affects the leadership of Kazakhstan as well as regular citizens. However, that may be changing.

The information climate in Kazakhstan is not very free. According to Reporters Without Borders, Kazakhstan has placed in the bottom 15% of all nations in terms of press freedom (Reporters Without Borders, 2021). And, the country ranks 117 out of 136 in their citizens’ right to government information. Moreover, since the vast majority of internet access is through KazakhTelecom, the state uses its significant regulatory authority to ensure that all Internet traffic passes through infrastructure controlled by that company. So, selective content filtering is widely used before even the Internet Service Providers can do their jobs (OpenNet Initiative, 2010). What these (and other) indicators tell us is that Kazakhstan is in a fairly restricted situation, but it could be worse.

The Diplomat, an Asia-Pacific focused publication, ran a detailed story about Kazakh-Russian Relations in the context of the war in Ukraine on March 7, 2022. This was the main inspiration for this report (although the majority of my points and research come from elsewhere). The article’s author is a Kazakh researcher who is using a pseudonym: Aliya Askar. (This implies how they feel the story might be taken by relevant persons in both Kazakhstan and Russia.) And, we must look at the previously mentioned long history to attempt to understand this evolving situation.

Formed in 1936, the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic was a part of the USSR until the leaders declared sovereignty on October 25, 1990. Nursultan Nazarbayev was elected as President shortly after (a post in which he served until March 2019). As for the foreign relations between Moscow and Nur-Sultan (Kazakhstan’s capital), things have been fairly chummy. They collaborate closely on matters in space (See: the Baikonur Cosmodrome) and in the ground. The Russian Federation themselves have invested over a billion dollars in the rich fossil fuels under the country (Cohen, 2022). On top of that, ethnic Russians measure about 24% of the total population (Bespyatov, 2009), making it a sizable minority. All these factors make countries like Kazakhstan susceptible to the long-established Russian strategy.

The United States’ Department of State made a list of common “Disinformation Narratives” peddled by the Kremlin. Although these two countries have always been wary of one another (see: the Cold War) and could never be truly objective about the other, the observations are of import. Specifically, #4 in this list claims that pro-Democracy protests (ie. “color revolutions”) in post-Soviet countries, are the work of the US (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Such narratives are circulated by questionably impartial groups. According to a report published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “[the] tightly regulated civic sector [is] comprised of pro-government and/or apolitical organizations. […] they represent a continuation of institutionalized civil society actors that existed in the Soviet era” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017).

And, just like in the Soviet Era, the organizations mentioned, “cannot and do not challenge existing power structures and instead serve to reinforce state control.” Also, state-funded media is likely in on the misinformation (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017). But in Kazakhstan (back in January 2022), This was likely not the case. By presenting this narrative, Putin (through government connections) gets to influence his neighbors.

And, as a corollary to the above, country-wide, strategy, personal relationships are a part of this. According to President Tokayev, from an August 2021 article, “[Putin] commended the bilateral ties between Kazakhstan and Russia, stressing that the two countries are allies” (The Astana Times, 2021). Putin may be chummy here, but in 2014, he said, “[President Nazarbayev] created a state in a territory that had never had a state before. The Kazakhs had no statehood,” to the former president (Traynor, 2014). Once again, this is an instance where Putin lies to get what he wants (a more blatant form of misinformation).

Finally, the misinformation affects both Kazakh and Russian citizens alike. openDemocracy is an independent and international organization dedicated to journalism which, “challenges power, inspires change and builds leadership among groups underrepresented in the media” (openDemocracy.net). In their work covering the war in Ukraine from Kazakhstan, they made some interesting discoveries. Those who defended Russia’s military attack all shared one trait: they watched Russian state TV, which is widely available in Kazakhstan. This is in opposition to the, “more than 1,500 people gathered in Almaty, the [Kazakhstan]’s largest city, to protest the war” (Shapagat & Samoilovich & Sorbello, 2022).

What the openDemocracy report tells us is that Putin has successfully managed to polarize opinions through (relatively) indirect means. We know this is likely the case due to what was proven to have occurred with the 2016 US Presidential Election. Records show that the Kremlin, “probed state voter databases for insecurities; released politically damaging information on the internet; spread propaganda on Twitter, Facebook, YouTube and Instagram; staged rallies in Florida and Pennsylvania” (Abrams, 2019). (Those are among multiple attempted hackings of campaigns and shady business dealings with the Trump organization.)

However, technological sophistication is not the only difference. To influence their southern neighbor, Russia heavily relies on proximity in this situation. It is the old-fashioned way of spreading propaganda, and what we in America are quite familiar with, television and radio. In the same way Fox News caters to a specific audience, Russian radio and TV permeate the airways and can reach out to their target audience. Any one of the 24% of Kazakhs who are ethnically Russian. Of course, not everybody is susceptible to this kind of misinformation, but it is significant.

This climate of misinformation is not entirely a hopeless situation. This is not at all the case since there are some factors making Putin’s goal not-so-trivial to achieve. According to Polygraph.info, which is a subgroup of Voice of America,

[Kazakhstan’s] vast energy resources; extensive Western investments in the energy sector and other industries; the country’s multi-vector foreign policy and rising international profile; its strong relations with Turkey and the Islamic world; its liberal policy on minorities and minority languages, including Russian; and Nazarbayev’s ability to keep Moscow at bay for the last 28 years (Polygraph.info, 2019).

This shows that the current information climate is not monotone. Going back to the openDemocracy findings, they note that the majority of Kazakhs who support Russia in the Ukraine conflict (partially because they watch Russian state media) are older (Shapagat & Samoilovich & Sorbello, 2022). As more and more younger people join the Kazakh voter base and government, they will be further resisting Russian influence.

Currently, though, Kazakhstan’s abstinence from voting in the UN (among other decisions made by President Tokayev) signals a divide between Moscow and Nur-Sultan. As Aliya Askar writes in their The Diplomat article, “If Kazakhstan can maintain a neutral stance, and good relations with Russia and the West, it can possibly play a peacemaking role” (Askar, 2022). Their handling of this struggle between Putin and the people of Kazakhstan can have long-lasting consequences. Not just for Eastern Europe, but the global environments of trade and diplomacy.

References:

Askar, A. (2022, March 14). Kazakh-Russian relations in the context of the war in Ukraine. The Diplomat. Retrieved April 2, 2022, from https://thediplomat.com/2022/03/kazakh-russian-relations-in-the-context-of-the-war-in-ukraine/

Beaumont, P. (2022, March 6). Ukraine has fastest-growing refugee crisis since Second World War, says UN. The Guardian. Retrieved April 2, 2022, from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/06/ukraine-fastest-growing-refugee-crisis-since-second-world-war

Bespyatov, T. (2009). kazakhstan-ethnic2009-census. Tim Bespyatov.

bne correspondent. (2022, January 6). Fake news? conflicting reports of shooting in Almaty as Russian and Kazakh governments appear to manipulate reporting for own agendas. bne IntelliNews. Retrieved April 2, 2022, from https://intellinews.com/fake-news-conflicting-reports-of-shooting-in-almaty-as-russian-and-kazakh-governments-appear-to-manipulate-reporting-for-own-agendas-231003/

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (2017, May 18). Delegitimization and division in Russia – civil society under assault: Repression and responses in Russia, Egypt, and Ethiopia. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved April 23, 2022, from https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/05/18/delegitimization-and-division-in-russia-pub-69958/

Cohen, A. (2022, February 9). The future of Western Energy Investments in Kazakhstan. Forbes. Retrieved April 2, 2022, from https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2022/02/07/the-future-of-western-energy-investments-in-kazakhstan/?sh=3586232a54b4

Hu, Margaret. (2022, March 14). Kazakhstan’s internet shutdown is the latest episode in an ominous trend: Digital authoritarianism. The Conversation. Retrieved April 2, 2022, from https://theconversation.com/kazakhstans-internet-shutdown-is-the-latest-episode-in-an-ominous-trend-digital-authoritarianism-174651

Light, F. (2022, April 3). Russia’s involvement in Kazakhstan’s crisis could have wide implications. The Moscow Times. Retrieved April 2, 2022, from https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/01/06/russias-involvement-in-kazakhstans-crisis-could-have-wide-implications-a75985

Mackinnon, A. (2022, January 14). Russian propagandists zero in on Kazakh crisis. Foreign Policy. Retrieved April 2, 2022, from https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/14/russia-kazakhstan-propaganda/

Magid, J. (2022, March 2). UN General Assembly, including Israel, votes overwhelmingly to condemn Russia. The Times of Israel. Retrieved April 2, 2022, from https://www.timesofisrael.com/un-general-assembly-including-israel-votes-overwhelmingly-to-condemn-russia/

Noubel, F. (2022, January 7). The myth of a stable Kazakhstan is shattered within a day as neighbours watch anxiously. Global Voices. Retrieved April 2, 2022, from https://globalvoices.org/2022/01/05/the-myth-of-a-stable-kazakhstan-is-shattered-within-a-day-as-neighbours-watch-anxiously/

openDemocracy. (n.d.). About openDemocracy. openDemocracy. Retrieved April 2, 2022, from https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/about/

OpenNet Initiative. (2010, December 9). Kazakhstan. Retrieved April 23, 2022, from https://opennet.net/research/profiles/kazakhstan

Reporters Without Borders. (2021). 2020 World Press Freedom index. RSF. Retrieved April 23, 2022, from https://rsf.org/en/ranking

Rfe/rl. (2022, April 1). Top official says Kazakhstan won’t help Russia evade western sanctions. RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. Retrieved April 2, 2022, from https://www.rferl.org/a/kazakhstan-evade-sanctions-russia/31781750.html

Rfe/rl. (2022, January 19). Russia-led military alliance completes withdrawal from Kazakhstan. RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. Retrieved April 2, 2022, from https://www.rferl.org/a/kazakhstan-csto-troops-withdrawal-security/31661294.html

Shapagat, A., Samoilovich, M., & Sorbello, P. (2022, March 23). How Kazakhstan society is divided over the Russia-Ukraine war. openDemocracy. Retrieved April 2, 2022, from https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/ukraine-russia-war-opinion-kazakhstan-divided-putin/

The Astana Times. (2021, August 23). Tokayev, Putin meet in Moscow, discuss key security issues. The Astana Times. Retrieved April 2, 2022, from https://astanatimes.com/2021/08/tokayev-putin-meet-in-moscow-discuss-key-security-issues/

Traynor, I. (2014, September 1). Kazakhstan is latest Russian neighbour to feel Putin’s chilly nationalist rhetoric. The Guardian. Retrieved April 2, 2022, from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/01/kazakhstan-russian-neighbour-putin-chilly-nationalist-rhetoric

U.S. Department of State. (2022, January 21). Russia’s top five persistent disinformation narratives. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved April 2, 2022, from https://www.state.gov/russias-top-five-persistent-disinformation-narratives/

Walker, S.; Bisenov, N. (2022, January 6). Russian paratroopers arrive in Kazakhstan as unrest continues. The Guardian. Retrieved April 2, 2022, from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jan/06/shots-heard-in-kazakhstan-as-protests-enter-third-day