145 Final Country Report
Russia has been known for heavy media regulation online and in print within the country. In recent years, this trend has grown. In the height of the Ukraine conflict, extreme measures have been taken by the Kremlin and Putin to regulate Russian originated news. I read a New York Times article about the recent restrictions and looked deeper into their effects on media companies, journalists, and Russian citizens. As an overview, the wording of the new fake news laws makes it extremely difficult for journalists and media companies to work.
There are several laws that establish publishing barriers. One of the most prominent is the Mass Media Law that was first established in 1991. The law sets the basis for a long history of censorship in the post-Soviet Union era. The law covers media freedoms established in the Russian constitution. The constitution states the principles are the freedom of mass communication and the inadmissibility of censorship on that communication. The Mass Media Law includes exceptions for criminal acts, narcotics, counter-terrorism operations, child victims, subliminal stimuli, and extremist activities to safeguard against any abuse of the stated principles (Lamzin 2016). Subliminal stimuli are an exception that people may not be aware of if there are no regulations against it. This is sensory stimuli that is below someone’s conscious perception. This takes away a persuasion tactic that could be considered unethical. The Law on Traditional Family Values, the Anti-tobacco Law, and the Child Protection Law all further assist in restricting what can be placed in the mass media (Lamzin 2016).
The safeguards against media freedom abuse are extensive. Under each of the categories listed above there are many groups of restricted content. Notable in the criminal acts category, it states that the supreme court should consider the current political and social state of the country in determining if the published words are criminal (Lamzin 2016). There is a higher chance of punishment from the courts when the country is engaged in unfavorable military aggression. This is important with the current war in Ukraine. Another is in the counter-terrorism operations category. This provision allows for media procedure to be changed so that no information puts the lives or health of others at risk during these operations (Lamzin 2016). However, it is evident that the wording leaves room for further government control. In light of current events, these provisions are critical.
There are aspects that apply even before content is released. Under the same law, there are restrictions for gaining a mass media license to make content related products. This applies to individuals, associations, enterprises, institutions, organizations, and state bodies (Lamzin 2016). Any type of media outlet must submit a request to obtain the proper licensing. In many cases they can send back the request even without consideration. Also, commission is established so that information can be requested from government officials regarding state activities (Lamzin 2016). Similarly, the request may be denied if the information they are asking for contains state secrets or falls in a restricted subject category.
Altogether, the law presents the rights of journalists or the lack thereof. The legislation lists criminal and civil charges that can be placed upon journalist for publishing misinformation information. Though the term misinformation is not directly stated, it is implied. The law is written vaguely including the intentional spread of untrue information and the discrediting of another person, organization, or reputation of a citizen. It is clear that this law was enacted to provide a great coverage of governmental control. The vagueness leaves interpretation in the hands of the Federal Service for Supervision of Information Technologies and Communications (Roskomnadzor) and their desires.
Significant restrictions started adding up in 2016. Restrictions came about on who could own, control, or run Russian-based mass media. Non-Russian citizen were the target of this limitation. This demonstrated a push by the government toward Russian produced media. In the same time period, restrictions were added on paid TV channels, publications, and distribution of media content. Additionally, there was a large increase in governmental control over internet media. Though these restrictions effect individual journalists, the attack was directed towards the media market at large. A major takeaway from these restrictions was that Russian government organizations could block access to any website, television, or radio channel without getting a court order (Lamzin 2016). The only action Roskomnadzor needs to take is to allow for the given media company to respond to a deletion request (Lamzin 2016). If the specific information isn’t deleted in a few days, then the website can and will be blocked.
Strong penalties are in place to back up these restrictions. If the misinformation results in the discrediting of another’s honor or reputation, then there can be a fine up to 1 million RUB or services up to 240 hours. If the individual suffers danger, then the fine can increase up to 3 million RUB and work can increase up to 420 hours. In the most serious case, if the media presents misinformation and couples with the accusation of a serious crime, then the fine can be up to 5 million RUB or 480 hours of work. Another penalty that is relevant to the current times is centered around public calls to action. If a public call to action using mass media or the internet violates the integrity of the Russian Federation, there can be up to 480 hours of work and restriction to certain activities, or imprisonment for up to 5 years with restriction to certain activities for 3 years (Lamzin 2016).
Many more developments in media control have been created in the last 10 years. First, there has been greater execution of insider trading regulations. These regulations are separate from libel but still pose greater government control over individuals. The laws limiting this behavior can change the legal status of individual journalist and editorials by removing their source confidentiality. The government does so by requiring media outlets to disclose their sources during an investigation (Lamzin 2016). Secondly, rules have established that publishing information that gives away the identity of a minor who committed or is suspected of committing a crime is illegal without the consent of the minor’s legal representative. Thirdly, there is ban on the use of explicit language in television and radio. If such language is used, fines and/or suspension is brought upon the media distributor (Lamzin 2016).
As of March 4, 2022, Russia has further censored free speech and mass media. Putin blocked access to Facebook and other large foreign media outlets for their spread of “false information” surrounding the invasion of Ukraine (Troianovski 2022). Russia’s internet regulator says Facebook in particular discriminates against Russian produced news; however, other Meta platforms remain available (Troianovski 2022). The blocking extends to Russian-language websites that are owned outside of Russia. These media bans come as Russia receives sanctions and other anti-war messages from across the world.
The restrictions don’t just affect international media outlets, they effect Russian independent media as well. The State Duma passed a law criminalizing the publishing of false information about their armed forces. Similar to the Mass Media Law, this law was written in a vague way so that there aren’t clear lines for what constitutes a violation. The law was quickly signed by Putin. The new law makes calling the invasion a “war” a criminal offense (Troianovski 2022). In addition, it is illegal to site all sources other than Russia’s Defense Ministry. In Russia, the events are categorized as a “special military operation on the territory of Ukraine”. If one were to call others to impose sanctions on Russia or protest against the operation, they would receive fines and years of imprisonment. Amendments to the Criminal Code allow for up to 15 years in prison for knowingly publishing false information regarding military operations (Troianovski 2022). Russian media groups previously spoke out against the violence, and many are now temporarily shutting down to avoid criminal charges and prosecution.
The impact of these additional restrictions is seen through recent journalist prosecutions. Mikhail Afanasyev is the chief editor of Novy Fokus in the Khakassia, a federal subject of Russia in East Siberia. He was arrested on April 13, 2022, for publishing content critical of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (Staff 2022). He has been accused of libel a couple times in the past 13 years (Staff 2022). However, now he is facing the possibility of 15 years in jail because of the new criminal code amendments.
There are certainly more long-term effects from these laws. The right to choose what content you want to consume has diminished. As a result, Russian citizens have begun to use virtual private networks and the Telegram messaging app to access these now blocked sites (Troianovski 2022). However, these bypasses don’t help the news outlets that have shutdown. Instead, some have excepted the shutdown and/or liquidated their sites. TV Rain, an independent television channel, followed this path (Troianovski 2022). Others have moved their operating home to surrounding countries. Those who chose to stay in Russia and remain operating removed all content related to the conflict. This last stance is the one taken by the Moscow Times. No matter what route a company takes, millions of citizens are being silenced and tuned out.
The Kremlin holds the narrative that all their actions are for national security and the dismantling of fake news. However, it appears that the public opposition to the war in Ukraine is the issue driving the actions of the government. Though there is a long history of censorship going back to the Soviet Union, the harsh attacks on independent news outlets in the last month prove the severity of the current environment. Russian authorities have written and signed their way to a single sided portrayal of events.
With the independent media blackout, the government has left their people with strictly state-run media, grabbing control of the country’s information spread. Nonetheless, the government-created propaganda has not been openly welcomed by journalists. Noteworthy, Marina Ovsyannikova interrupted Vremya news to hold up a “No War” sign. She was fined 30,000 RUB and could face further prosecution (France 24 2022). Her case demonstrates the strong enforcement of the new law. In another notable case, a Russian senior foreign correspondent for a state-run television network quit amidst the new state-run media structure (France 24 2022). Several other journalists have also stepped down.
A large number of journalists have not only stepped down, but they have also chosen to flee the country. Alexey Kovalev is one example. Kovalev is the investigative editor of Meduza, an independent news outlet based in Russia. Following the new legislation and the talk of martial law in Moscow, he left and went to Latvia (Kovalev 2022). After leaving, he has been able to share his insights into the censorship. Another example is Lenta.ru. The whole editorial team left together and have set up shop again in Latvia (Kovalev 2022). Journalists are not only unable to perform their jobs, but they have also had their basic rights taken away. The likelihood of prosecution has become too great. These stories have spread across the world and as a result journalists have received donations to continue operating.
Moving forward, it is possible that Russia will be removed from the European Convention of Human Rights. As of today, Russia will remain in the convention until September 16, 2022, unless they are removed by a vote beforehand. After September 16th, given that they are not removed, Russia must prove that their laws meet the standards for basic human rights, including the freedom of expression (Gibson Dunn 2022). The recently added laws are in violation of the convention’s standards. Any further acts may affect Russia’s competency in the eyes of the ECHR. Recently, the ECHR has noted that Russia’s censorship has an “ulterior purpose” other than protecting national security (Gibson Dunn 2022).
It is unclear when the violence in Ukraine will end and what effects the end will have on Russian censorship law. However, given the long history of Soviet and Russian censorship, it is unlikely that the harassment of journalism will stop. Censorship is nothing new, but it has grown extremely intense. The large number of journalists that have chosen to flee the country are a testament to that. Even with the loss of journalists alone, the independent media reporting from inside Russia will forever be changed. Independent journalism is a source of truth and today the truth is not being protected in Russia.
Sources:
Lamzin, P., Otkina, A., & Bulgakov, I. (2016). Media Regulation in Russia: A Landscape Analysis of Laws and Trends. TrustLaw. https://www.trust.org/contentAsset/raw-data/4798c68a-eed1-4660-b7c9-fc16a0032cc9/file
Kovalev, A. Perspective | I’m a Russian journalist. I had to flee my country. (2022, March 11). Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/03/11/russian-journalist-putin-crackdown/
Russian journalists quit over Putin “propaganda.” (2022, March 25). France 24. https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20220325-russian-journalists-quit-over-putin-propaganda
Russia’s suppression of the media violates its international law obligations. (2022, March 24). Gibson Dunn. https://www.gibsondunn.com/russias-suppression-of-the-media-violates-its-international-law-obligations/
Staff. (2022, April 14). Russia: Journalist arrested for ‘fake news’ about armed forces. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/14/russia-journalist-arrested-for-fake-news-about-armed-forces
Troianovski, A. (2022, March 4). Russia takes censorship to new extremes, stifling war coverage. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/04/world/europe/russia-censorship-media-crackdown.html