The threat that Taiwan faces from China is not just limited to armed invasion. In the age of the internet, Taiwan also faces the threat of disinformation from China, which can be very difficult to identify. With tensions between Taiwan (ROC) and China (PRC) becoming increasingly tense, there have been civilian initiatives aimed against the threat of Chinese disinformation, including both passive measures, such as bots that scan for disinformation, as well as active measures, such as educational campaigns in media literacy.

Background

To understand the purpose of Chinese disinformation campaigns against Taiwan, it is crucial to first understand why there is tension between the two sides in the first place (often referred to as cross-Strait tensions, with Strait referring to the Taiwan Strait, the body of water separating Taiwan and mainland China). In 1949, The Republic of China lost control of mainland China after losing a civil war to the Communist government. The Republic of China, also known as the Nationalist government, fled to the island of Taiwan, which was already under their control, leaving the Communists to establish the People’s Republic of China on the mainland, and the Nationalist government to retain control of Taiwan. This meant that China and Taiwan, which were previously both ruled by the Republic of China, had been separated, with the PRC on the mainland and ROC on Taiwan. Ever since 1949, the PRC has claimed Taiwan to be an inseparable part of their territory, while Taiwan has refused to reunify with the mainland, resulting in decades of intimidation from China and international isolation.

With the 2024 presidential election coming up in Taiwan, the stakes are high for Taiwan’s future. The two main political camps in Taiwan are split into two colors, blue and green, similar to how we use red and blue in the United States. The Kuomintang (KMT) ruled Taiwan for most of its history, and they are the main party in the blue camp. They are largely considered to be more keen on closer ties with China than their counterparts in the green camp, which has the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). In 2016, Tsai Ing-wen, representing the DPP, won the presidential election, initiating a transfer of power. and reviving the spirit of Taiwanese independence. President Tsai won reelection in 2020, and is therefore ineligible to run again in 2024. From China’s perspective, a KMT win in 2024 would be a huge boost to their own goals of dampening the calls for Taiwanese independence and keeping the island within its reach.

Taiwanese elections, as well as the constant military threat that China poses to Taiwan, are both major motives for spreading disinformation.

What’s at Stake?

Let’s look more closely at the motives behind spreading disinformation and what is at stake. It is often deemed inevitable that China will one day reclaim Taiwan, but there are many factors at play that could determine how soon that day many come. While China does not rule out the possibility of taking Taiwan forcefully, this is a nightmare scenario and is likely a final option if peaceful means fail to work. A peaceful reunification, however, would not occur with anti-reunification political ideology in place. Therefore, China takes great interest in Taiwan’s politics, and benefits the most from pro-China political figures holding office. This makes the upcoming Taiwanese presidential election in 2024 a massive event for Taiwan, China, and the entire world. Unfortunately, it also encourages disinformation as a means to sway voters. An example of fake news that could influence elections is the false claim that current president Tsai Ing-Wen has an illegitimate doctoral degree¹⁰. Regardless of where or who this claim originated from, it had the intention of defaming her in the public eye, and is the exact type of news that can completely change the trajectory of a country’s development and global positioning.

Also important to consider is the constant fight for external political support between China and Taiwan. China is a global superpower, and their influence is so great that much of the world does not recognize Taiwan. That being said, Taiwan desperately needs political support to serve as a deterrent towards Chinese aggression. Similarly, China wishes to isolate Taiwan and garner support for the unification of Taiwan with the mainland. While this mainly applies to formal political relationships, it also holds true for public sentiment. For example, imagine pro-Chinese disinformation on Taiwan begins circulating in the United States. The public’s image of Taiwan is malleable due to little background knowledge, and they feel strongly about the news they are seeing, especially if the news is presented in a way that puts something at stake for the average American. This could completely change the way that all of America feels about Taiwan, and could completely turn Americans against its own government for having a commitment to supporting Taiwan. This is an extreme example, but it demonstrates how influential disinformation could be if unchecked.

Countermeasures

The war against Chinese disinformation has been taken up by some Civil Society Organizations (CSO), one of them being DoubleThink Lab. According to their website, “Doublethink Lab was founded in 2019 to strengthen democracy through enhancing digital defenses” and is “focused on researching malign Chinese influence operations and disinformation campaigns and their impacts”, among several other similar goals. In an interview with Civicus, the CEO of DoubleThink Lab cited the disinformation campaigns targeting the 2018 Taiwanese local elections as a major impetus that led to the organization’s creation. DoubleThink Lab’s website is full of research and projects related to disinformation in Taiwan.

An interesting study conducted by DoubleThink Lab focused on Taiwan’s 2020 elections and the impact that fake news had on voters. The surveys conducted indicated that “more than 70 percent of respondents thought their candidates had been targeted with false information” and “at least half of the respondents said the electoral prospects of their candidate were affected by false information”.¹⁰ Just from this baseline assessment of voter sentiment, it is already apparent that false information (a neutral term) was a significant factor in the elections.¹⁰

Another one of the solutions to disinformation in Taiwan is an open-source chatbot that is programmed to detect it called Cofacts. Founded in 2016 by Billion Lee, Cofacts is developed with closed commmunities in mind. Closed communities, such as chat rooms, are different from other public social media platforms in that they consist of many small communities that are not interconnected. The nature of these small closed communities makes it harder to control the flow of fake news, which is where Cofacts can be helpful. LINE is the dominant platform for everyday text messaging in Taiwan, and it is the platform that Cofacts chatbot was designed for.

Conclusion

Taiwan faces unique challenges in the future, especially as the next election approaches. The threat of Chinese disinformation campaigns is being taken very seriously by quite a few civil organizations, but it remains a tough issue to deal with. Civil service organizations like DoubleThink Lab and software like Cofacts chatbot are both examples of countermeasures being taken to protect vulnerable internet users from falling into false information traps. As the internet continues to become more and more advanced, so too will the ways that it is used to disseminate misinformation, meaning this issue must continue to be addressed, and vigilance must be maintained. This not only applies to Taiwan, but to the rest of the world as well, as we all learn to better navigate the digital world.

References:

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10. Tseng, P.-Y., & Chen, Y.-J. (2021, May 6). An analysis on the impact of false information on Taiwanese voters. Medium. Retrieved April 2, 2023, from https://medium.com/doublethinklab/an-analysis-on-the-impact-of-false-information-on-taiwanese-voters-c061500a898c
11. Taiwan: ‘China will do to us what it did to Hong Kong, and what it has long done to Tibetans and Uighurs’. CIVICUS Global Alliance. (2022, November 15). Retrieved April 2, 2023, from https://www.civicus.org/index.php/media-resources/news/interviews/6154-taiwan-china-will-do-to-us-what-it-did-to-hong-kong-and-what-it-has-long-done-to-tibetans-and-uighurs Interview with Min-Hsuan Wu (aka ttcat), CEO and co-founder of DoubleThink Lab
12. Doublethink lab. Doublethink Lab. (n.d.). Retrieved April 2, 2023, from https://doublethinklab.org/